amend ICA 2002 to address the concerns. These amendments were enacted as the Competition (Amendment) Act 2007 and CCI commenced operations shortly thereafter. 5 Since commencement of operations nearly a decade ago, the Indian and Pakistani competition laws have evolved along different paths and at different paces. In both countries, however, the implementation of these laws has been shaped by two distinct factors: first, by the decisions taken by the CCI and CCP in their capacity as the first tier competition institutions and second, by their interactions with the general high courts pre-existing in the legal systems of the countries. The ICA 2002 and PCO 2007 (and PCA 2010) do not factor in the possible impact of high courts exercising their inherent constitutional jurisdiction in respect of competition matters. However, in this article I demonstrate that interactions between competition laws and pre-existing legal systems are a substantial part of competition related litigation in both India and Pakistan. I argue that these interactions between the Indian and Pakistani competition laws and the pre-existing legal systems are shaped in part by the strategies, mechanisms and institutions 6 through which the countries had initially adopted their respective competition laws. I further argue that the nature of these interactions has a discernible impact on the direction and pace of evolution and enforcement of competition laws in the countries.
This article is, therefore, organised as follows: In section 2, I outline the theoretical links between the interactions and the performance of the competition laws. In section 3, I identify the framework within which the interactions between competition laws and pre-existing legal systems are likely to take place. I identify possible legal bases on which these interactions may be initiated. I also indicate the Indian and Pakistani institutions that are likely to engage in these interactions. In section 4, I examine and compare two different categories of interactions: those that emanate from interim orders of the NCAs, and those initiated on the basis of final orders of the NCAs. In section 5, I examine the impact of the strategies, mechanisms and legal and political institutions engaged by India and Pakistan in adopting the competition laws on the nature of these interactions. In section 6, I consider the effects of these interactions on the development and enforcement of the competition laws. In the final section I conclude. For the purposes of this article I focus only on enforcement orders of CCI from 2009 to 2017 and of CCP from 2008 to 2017 ie orders in cases of abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive agreements.
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Chapter 2 THEORETICAL SIGNIFCANCE OF THE INTERACTIONS
Both the Indian and Pakistani competition laws are modelled on international precedents and may, therefore, be deemed to be 'legal transplants' within the meaning given to the term in comparative law literature. 8 Whilst comparative law scholars recognise legal transplants as an important source of laws, they urge the importance of compatibility and warn countries against adopting laws without considering the contexts from which the laws originate and the contexts for which they are intended. Interestingly, however, the scholars are not often in agreement about the specific features of the contexts of the adopting and originating countries that in their view must be compatible with each other and the likely impact of the compatibility.
Whilst Montesquieu and Kahn-Freund are of the view that the legal transplant must be compatible with the institutions, political law, social and political context of the adopting country, 9 Trebilcock and Iacobucci, writing specifically about competition law transplants, emphasize the need for commonalities between 'particularities of history, initial conditions, institutional traditions, and political economy considerations' of the originating and adopting countries. 10 For Gal, the 'commonality' 5 On 20 th May 2009 the government, by notification nos. S.O. 1241(E) and S.O. 1242(E) brought into force provisions relating to anti-competitive agreements and abuses of dominant position in ICA 2002. Provisions related to mergers did not come into force until 2011. 6 The term 'institutions' includes both formal and informal systems of rules as well as organizations to the extent that they are engaged in implementing the Laws. See Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press 1990).
7 I focus on orders for anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position only because CCI's merger regime did not become operational until 2011 and at present the data is not sufficient to provide a basis for comparison with Pakistan's merger regime. 8 between the contexts of the originating and adopting countries encompasses 'almost all issues which relate to the relationship between law and society' whereas Shahein underscores the importance of examining the 'specific political, economic and social environment' of the two countries. 11 Mattei, somewhat fine-tunes this discussion by referring particularly to the need for the legal transplant to be compatible with the 'machinery of justice' in the adopting country. 12 However, he does not explain what exactly he means by this machinery of justice.
Whilst discussing the likely impact of compatibility (or lack thereof), scholars link it with the 'success' of the legal transplant, however, they do not appear to fully explore the concept of success or its precise links with compatibility. Kahn-Freund speaks of the legal transplant being 'rejected' in the adopting country if certain contextual features in that country are not compatible with those in the originating country. However, he does not explain what he means by 'rejection' or how and when it may occur. 13 Similarly, whilst Watson argues that for a transplant to be successful, it must continue to 'grow in' and become 'a part of the borrowing country' and that 'ascribing a different meaning to the legal transplant should not be confused with its rejection in the country', he neither explains what 'growing' means nor explores the factors that may contribute to (or hinder) this growth in the adopting country.
14 Alhtough Mattei implies that compatibility of the legal transplant with the 'machinery of justice' in the adopting country is a pre-condition of its success, 15 he does not identify possible points at which the transplant and the machinery of justice may interact with other or the legal bases on which the interaction may take place. Teubner and Berkowitz et al add further dimensions to this dynamic: Teubner indicates that the success of a legal transplant lies in its ability to interact productively with other elements in the legal organism in which it is transplanted, 16 whilst Berkowitz et al suggest that the performance of a transplant may be judged by the extent to which actors (including legal actors) in the adopting country are able to understand, apply and utilize it. 17 This discussion suggests that the nature of the interaction between an adopted law and the preexisting legal system of the adopting country is an important indicator of the success of the borrowed law. It further indicates that the more 'productive' this interaction the greater the likelihood of success of the adopted law and that although productivity is not defined, it may be understood as the extent to which the adopted law is understood, applied and utilised by actors in the pre-existing legal system.
Chapter 3 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK & LEGAL BASIS OF INTERACTIONS
Chapter 4 The institutional framework
The interaction between the Indian and Pakistani competition laws and the pre-existing legal systems of the two countries takes place through the agency of the institutions they establish. Institutions envisaged under both Indian and Pakistani competition laws are the first-tier CCI and CCP (collectively the NCAs) and the second-tier tribunals. Both laws also confer a competition appellate jurisdiction on their Supreme Courts, thereby making these third (and final) institutions in the competition stream. Institutions representing the pre-existing legal systems of the two countries are the high courts established under the Constitutions of the two countries and the Supreme Courts sitting in their constitutional appellate jurisdiction. Possible interactions between the competition institutions and the courts may be outlined as in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 by the solid black lines. These interactions are activated when an aggrieved person invokes constitutional grounds to file a petition before the high court and the high court exercises its inherent constitutional jurisdiction to respond to the petition. The decision of the high court either returns the matter to the NCA or is appealed before the Supreme Court sitting in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court decision may return the matter to the high court for further action, before it is finally returned to the NCA or it may return it directly to the NCA. This stream of interactions may be initiated from interim orders of the NCAs (ie orders passed by the NCAs whilst proceedings are still pending before them) and/or final orders of the NCAs (ie orders passed at the conclusion of the proceedings before the NCAs).
The red lines in this figure represent the path that a competition matter would take if it was appealed through the institutions envisaged in the competition laws of the two countries. Juxtaposing the black and red lines in this figure reveals the extent to which the neat red implementation structure may veer off course each time a matter is challenged before the courts in their constitutional jurisdiction. This is not to suggest that constitutional petitions should not be filed-indeed filing these petitions is the right of the aggrieved parties and they may not be prevented from availing it-but to highlight that whilst some petitions may only temporarily change the direction of competition enforcement in the country (such as when a petition from an order of the NCA is filed to a high court and the high court returns it to the NCA) others may derail it almost entirely (such as when the high court issues interim orders restraining the NCA or when the petitioners become embroiled in appeals before the Supreme Courts even from these interim orders).
Chapter 5 Reasons for not addressing petitions against orders tribunals
The reason for focusing only on actions emanating from orders of NCAs as opposed to those of tribunals is the lack of comparable data on orders of tribunals, which derives from erratic history of the tribunals in India and Pakistan. The Indian government established the tribunal with the mandate to hear appeals from CCI's interim as well as final orders almost simultaneously with the CCI. 18 The tribunal remained in operation for the next eight years except for a period of approximately one year, when it had a Chairperson but no members, and was, therefore, unable to hear any appeals. 19 22 and in the few months that the 2010 Ordinance remained in force, appeals from orders passed by more than one CCP member or by the appellate bench were directed to the high courts and from the orders of the high courts to the Supreme Court. 23 However, even after the PCA 2010 had stipulated that a tribunal be established, the government waited until 2011 to appoint the first member and Chairman of the tribunal 24 and until 2012 to appoint the technical members. 25 The tribunal had been functioning for only five months and had decided only one appeal 26 when in April 2013 one member resigned and the other retired due to having reached retirement age. The tribunal remained dysfunctional until 2015 when the government re-constituted it by appointing the requisite number of members. Also, in 2015 the tribunal first formulated rules to regulate its conduct and proceedings. 27 At present, the tribunal has passed no more than 20 orders.
Chapter 6 The legal bases for these interactions
The legal grounds on which these interactions may be initiated derive from the Indian and Pakistani Constitutions. 
Chapter 7 THE NATURE OF INTERACTIONS IN INDIA & PAKISTAN
In this section, I examine interactions that emanate from interim orders of the NCAs as well as their final orders. In examining the interactions I investigate and compare both the grounds on which persons aggrieved by actions or orders of the NCAs initiated petitions and the responses of the courts to these petitions. 28 ie writs directing a person carrying out a function in connection with the affairs of the state to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted to do or to do anything he is required to do. 29 ie writs declaring that any given act or proceeding performed by a person in connection with the affairs of the federation, has been done without lawful authority and is without legal effect. 30 ie writs directing that a person held in custody within the jurisdiction of the court may be presented in court. 31 ie writs requiring a person holding public office to show the authority of law under which he claims to hold that office.
Chapter 8 Interactions emanating from interim orders
From 2009 (when CCI commenced its enforcement actions) until December 2017, CCI passed 165 enforcement orders. 32 However, petitions were filed in respect of only 20 of these orders (12.12%) while these were still pending before CCI. At times, aggrieved persons filed more than one petition in respect of a single proceeding, however, in the 24 petitions filed before courts throughout India during this period, courts issued final orders in 21 and interim orders in only four. Of these four interim orders, three were replaced by final orders whilst relevant proceedings were still pending before CCI.
The interactions were initiated on a range of legal grounds. One ground repeatedly raised was that CCI did not have the jurisdiction to hear matters that had initially been taken up by its predecessor anti-monopoly authority, 33 particularly if the authority had initiated an investigation but failed to complete it. However, all courts before which this ground was raised unequivocally declared it to be without merit and directed the petitioners to submit to CCI's jurisdiction. 34 A further related ground raised before the courts was that CCI could not exercise its jurisdiction in respect of practices that had commenced before the coming into force of the relevant provisions of ICA 2002. However, in each of these petitions, the courts clarified that CCI had the jurisdiction to examine such conduct if it continued even after the provisions had come into force. 35 In at least one petition, an aggrieved party challenged CCI's powers to issue a show cause notice on the ground that doing so was tantamount to pre-judging the case. However, the courts clarified that CCI had the jurisdiction to form a preliminary view of a case at the time of issuing a show cause notice. 36 In other cases, parties challenged CCI's jurisdiction to initiate investigations. However, the courts did not entertain any petitions filed on this ground. 37 In certain petitions filed before them, the response of the courts varied from expressly endorsing CCI; to refusing to restrain it; to directing it to take certain actions; to restraining it from pursuing the matter against one or more of the parties to the proceedings pending before CCI, and very rarely, to restraining it from continuing with the proceedings altogether. Where the courts actually restrained CCI, they did so only for a finite period.
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In a few proceedings pending before CCI, the complainant itself appeared before the court. In one instance the complainant sought interim relief against the defendants, however, the court dismissed the petition and directed it to approach CCI. 39 In another instance, the complainant prayed that the court direct CCI to hear an application on an urgent basis. 40 In at least one recent case, CCI voluntarily gave an undertaking to the court that it would not to take adverse action against the defendants whilst proceedings were pending before the courts.
Pakistan
In Pakistan as in India, entities aggrieved by proceedings pending before CCP exercised their right to file petitions before the high courts. And, as in India, aggrieved parties filed petitions before the courts in respect of only a fraction of proceedings pending before CCP. Between 2008 and 2016, of the 37 proceedings, which culminated in CCP issuing a final order, petitions were filed in respect of only 6 or 16.2% of proceedings. However, the data reveals that often more than one petition was filed in respect of a single proceeding. Of the nine petitions filed before different high courts throughout the country, the courts issued final orders in only five, and interim orders in all nine. 42 These interim orders often gave rise to appeals before the Supreme Court and these five final orders merely remanded matters from the Supreme Court to the high courts or decided miscellaneous applications that had been filed along with the main petitions. None of the final orders addressed the merits of let alone finally decide the main petitions before them.
The petitions filed before the courts whilst proceedings were pending before CCP may be organised in two groups. The first group comprises petitions filed in the period when PCO 2007 was in force and the second group comprises petitions filed in the period after PCO 2007 had lapsed and includes petitions filed after the enactment of PCA 2010.
Some of the grounds raised in petitions filed when PCO 2007 was in force were that (i) CCP had not issued the show cause notice in accordance with PCO 2007; (ii) certain sections of PCO 2007, 43 and, therefore, CCP's actions in exercise of these sections, were ultra vires the Constitution and contrary to the fundamental rights stipulated in it; 44 (iii) the President had promulgated PCO 2007 without legal authority because the subject of competition was not within the legislative competence of the Parliament or the President; and (iv) PCO 2007 did not confer jurisdiction upon CCP to exercise its powers against the petitioners.
45 The courts accepted the majority of these petitions without investigating the specific grounds raised in them and issued interim orders restraining CCP from proceeding against the petitioners. the Parliament had ratified the Ordinance then in force. 47 In case of at least one petition the court granted an injunction on this ground and this injunction was relied upon in subsequent petitions to obtain similar injunctions. 48 The most notable petition of this period was filed by Liquefied Petroleum Gas Association of Pakistan (LPGAP) in which the courts not only granted an interim injunction in favour of LPGAP and suspended the operation of the show cause notice issued by CCP, but also held that petitions against actions or orders of CCP could validly be filed before any high court in the jurisdiction of which the petitioner carried on its business or in which the effect of CCP's actions was most likely to be felt. CCP challenged this order before the Supreme Court. However, instead of deciding the issue on merits, the Supreme Court simply remanded it to the high court for a decision on jurisdiction. Although the Supreme Court set aside the interim injunction issued by the high court, it did so on CCP's undertaking that it would not take any adverse action against the aggrieved parties them until the petitions pending before the high court were finally decided. Nearly eight years later, this matter is still pending before the high court and although CCP has passed final orders in the proceedings before it, it is restricted by law from enforcing its decision against the petitioners.
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Comparing the Indian and Pakistani interactions emanating from interim orders
The interactions between the Indian and Pakistani competition laws (as represented by CCI and CCP respectively) and the pre-existing legal systems of the countries (as represented by the courts) differ not only in the grounds on which petitions were filed against proceedings pending before CCI and CCP but also in the manner in which the Courts responded to the petitions filed before them.
The grounds on which persons aggrieved by proceedings pending before CCI filed petitions before the Indian courts generally either call into question CCI's authority to take notice of allegedly anti-competitive practices or the manner in which CCI takes such notice. These may be referred to as 'procedural' grounds. In Pakistan, only a small fraction of petitions filed against proceedings pending before CCP invoked procedural grounds. The majority of these petitions called into question the constitutionality of the particular iteration of the Pakistani competition law these were challenging; CCP's legal basis for existing and its power to initiate and pursue proceedings. These additional grounds may be referred to as 'substantive' grounds.
On the whole, Indian courts responded to the petitions filed before them with reasonable alacrity and clarity. Whilst the courts issued a range of orders none of these indefinitely and fully restrained the proceedings pending before CCI. In fact, in a number of cases the response of the courts not only supported CCI but also brought proceedings pending before it into greater conformity with due process norms prevalent in the country.
Pakistani courts, on the other hand, adopted a somewhat hesitant strategy in respect of petitions filed before them. In the majority of petitions, Pakistani courts admitted the petitions for hearing and granted interim orders either restraining CCP from continuing with the proceedings before it altogether or restraining it from enforcing any orders it may pass at the end of these proceedings. The courts issued 47 See n. 2. 48 By its order dated 14.01.2010, Sindh High Court granted an injunction on this ground in CP D-110/2010 (Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills). This order was relied upon in several other petitions and Sindh High Court granted injunctions in all of these. CCP challenged a number of orders of the high courts before the Supreme Court (eg in CPs 1065, 1066 and 1067/2010). However, CCP was unable to explain its delay in filing these CPs and, therefore, the Supreme Court only directed the high courts to hear the petitions expeditiously rather than directing that these may be dismissed altogether. the majority of these restraining orders in the very first hearing and often without provided CCP an opportunity of hearing.
The few petitions against interim orders that were finally decided were decided on purely technical grounds such as those filed by the APCMA and its members before the Islamabad High Court, which were dismissed for being premature 50 and the petition filed by Attock Cement Limited before the Sindh High Court 51 against CCP's show cause notice in the APCMA Case which was dismissed on the basis that the petitioner already had one appeal pending on this matter before the Supreme Court and another before the Lahore High Court. 52 The Pakistani courts did not pass any decisions on merits in any petitions filed before them.
Chapter 9 Interactions in respect of final orders of NCAs
India
In India no constitutional petitions were filed against CCI's final orders. This is due to the establishment of the tribunal concurrently with CCI, which provided aggrieved persons 'an adequate alternate remedy' to approaching the courts in their constitutional jurisdiction.
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Pakistan
The fact that for the greater portion of the first three years of its operation in Pakistan, the only right available to persons aggrieved by CCP's final orders was to appeal directly to the Supreme Court and after 2010, the delay and hesitation in establishing the tribunal meant that aggrieved persons had little choice but to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts to seek redress for their grievances.
One of the first petitions against a final order of the CCP was filed in the APCMA Case.
54 From the moment CCP had issued show cause notices to APCMA and its members, the APCMA Case had provoked considerable litigation, however, when the courts allowed CCP to pass a final order in this matter, it appeared that the on-going tussle between CCP and the high courts had been resolved in CCP's favour. However, before CCP could enforce its final order, the Lahore High Court, by its order dated 31 st August 2009, once again restrained CCP from taking any adverse action against the defendants. However, the Lahore High Court acknowledged that important constitutional and jurisdictional issues pertaining to CCP remained undecided, including whether the federal legislature was competent to enact PCO 2007; whether the provision for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court was unconstitutional, and whether the adjudicatory powers conferred on CCP by PCO 2007 were contrary to the constitutional principles of separation of powers. The only concession the Lahore High Court allowed the CCP in this regard was to allow it to publish its order on its official website. The Lahore High Court's order remains in force and to date, and CCP has still not enforced its final order against APCMA or any of its members.
A number of petitions against CCP's final orders raised procedural and substantive grounds similar to those that had been raised in petitions filed against CCP's interim orders. 55 These included grounds that CCP was not properly constituted; it lacked the requisite quorum at the time of passing the final order to pass the order; the order was not in accordance with the version of the competition law then in force in the country; that CCP had passed the order with mala fide intent and by exercising powers beyond its jurisdiction; 56 competition law could not retrospectively apply to agreements entered into 50 58 Some petitions urged questions of law as well as of fact in their grounds including that CCP's order was contrary to government policy and, therefore, exposed the petitioner to possible adverse governmental action, 59 and that CCP had not fully appreciated the facts of the matter in arriving at its final order. 60 In a majority of cases, and regardless of the grounds being realised in them, the court simply admitted the petitions and granted a restraining order to the petitioners. Nearly all these petitions are still pending and the interim injunctions granted by the courts against CCP have been allowed to continue from one date of hearing to the next with the result that a majority of these remain in force. As in the case of petitions filed in respect of interim orders, the Pakistani courts have not decided any petition filed against final orders on its merits.
The decision of the Supreme Court in a petition against CCI's decision in a merger case was hailed as an important breakthrough for Pakistan because it endorsed the status of CCP as a first tier competition institution. However, it is likely that this petition was decided because it did not raise important constitutional questions. 61 The petitioner had challenged before the Islamabad High Court, the conditions imposed by CCP in a second phase merger review of two fertilizer companies on the ground that CCP had acted in excess of its statutory powers. The high court had upheld CCP's order and declared that CCP had validly imposed conditions on the proposed merger. The petitioner appealed the order of the high court before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court granted relief to the petitioner on the ground that CCP had not provided it a right of hearing before determining the conditions of the merger and remanded the matter to CCP with the direction to re-hear the parties in respect of each of the conditions.
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Chapter 10 THE IMPACT OF ADOPTION PROCESSES ON INTERACTIONS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
The divergence in the nature of interactions in India and Pakistan and the fact that whilst in India these interactions emanate only from CCI's interim orders whilst in Pakistan these emanate from both interim and final orders may be traced to the processes through which India and Pakistan adopted their respective competition laws. The adoption processes have a direct impact on the nature of the interactions, which stems broadly from the extent to which the judiciary was engaged in the process and affects the judiciary's response to competition related petitions. These processes also have an important indirect impact, which derives from the extent to which the processes engage pre-existing institutions from different branches of the state, which then has a bearing on the attitude of these pre-existing institutions towards the competition laws. In order to understand the direct as well as the indirect impact it is important to first outline the adoption processes followed in either country. Whilst India had engaged a wide range of bottom-up, participatory and inclusive domestic institutions in the adoption process including different levels of the executive, the Parliament and the judiciary over a two-year period, Pakistan had engaged only the upper echelons of the executive and selected stakeholders at the time of introducing the law and that too for a relatively brief period.
Chapter 11 The direct impact of the adoption process on the interactions
The adoption process had a direct impact on the grounds on which petitions were filed before the courts as well as on the responses of the courts to these petitions. The fact that ICA 2002 had been passed through the long form legislative procedure provided in the Constitution that attempted to meaningfully engage a range of institutions at different levels meant that the petitions filed before the courts urged more procedural rather than substantive grounds. Whereas, the preponderance of substantive grounds raised in petitions filed before courts in Pakistan reveals the impact of the more limited engagement with institutions of the Pakistani adoption process and the fact that the process failed to address concerns of stakeholders let alone gain their support in the process. On the other hand, Pakistan's use of a small number of top-down exclusive institutions in the adoption process was further complicated by the fact that in 2007, when PCO 2007 was promulgated, the Pakistani judiciary already weakened by years of deference to the executive, 64 was embroiled in an unprecedented battle with the executive for its very survival. The combination of these factors had a twofold negative effect on subsequent interactions between CCP and the Pakistani courts: first, the judiciary remained largely unaware of competition principles and implementation scheme envisaged in the Pakistani competition law and second, and more damagingly, that it harboured a distrust for competition law because it belonged to the set of laws promulgated by the President soon before he turned against the judiciary and because it was one of the laws 'saved' from lapsing by the President by an amendment to the Constitution. 65 Whilst the second issue was somewhat ameliorated by the enactment of PCA 2010 because it demonstrated that the executive had placed the competition law before the Parliament in compliance of the order of the Supreme Court, 66 it did not lead to an accelerate the pace at which the judiciary responded to competition matters.
Given the commonalties in the Indian and Pakistani legal systems and legal cultures 67 and the endemic delay in deciding cases in both systems, 68 it is tempting, indeed appropriate, to consider whether 63 See n. 4 and text thereto. 64 Thrice in Pakistan's 70 year history, military dictators had asked the judiciary to take oaths of office on extra constitutional instruments. This not only prevented the judiciary from taking action against the military led executive, but also made it deferential to the executive. 65 See n. 2. 66 The order of the Pakistani Supreme Court dated 21.02.2013 in CP 102-L/2013 (ADG LDI (Pvt.) Limited v. Brain Telecommunications Limited) is the only instance in which the Supreme Court expressly endorsed CCP by referring a case to it even though the entity filing the case before the Supreme Court, had not impleaded CCP as a party to the proceedings. 67 India and Pakistan share a common legal history until their independence from British Rule in 1947 and have since, largely retained the legal system introduced by the British. 68 As per the data contained in Annual Reports of the Supreme Court of India 2015-2016 and the Annual Report of the the delay in the responses of the courts to the petitions filed before them may be rooted in their inherent natures. However, if the response of the courts to competition related matters challenges filed before them had been rooted only in the dilatory tendencies inherent in the pre-existing Indian and Pakistani legal systems, then it is unlikely that Indian courts would have disposed of a significant number of competition related challenges filed before them.
Chapter 12 The indirect impact of the adoption processes
In addition to the direct impact, the adoption processes in India and Pakistan also had an indirect impact on the interactions. In the case of India this indirect impact was largely positive. By engaging the Parliament in the adoption process over a period of time India had generated greater familiarity and perhaps even ownership and understanding of competition principles amongst members of Parliament. Further, by creating the Raghavan Committee and engaging institutions at different tiers of the executive, India had also ensured the ownership of the competition law by the executive. Both these factors are likely to have been important in ensuring that the government took seriously its responsibility to establish the tribunal. This had the impact of providing aggrieved persons with the necessary forum for addressing their grievances against CCI and thereby limited the scope as well as the number of interactions with the courts and almost entirely eliminated petitions from CCI's final orders.
In Pakistan, the indirect impact of the adoption process was almost entirely opposite to that in India. By keeping the Parliament at a distance throughout the already short adoption process the Pakistani government not only weakened the compatibility of PCO 2007 (and its subsequent iterations) with Pakistan's pre-existing legal system and cast a doubt on its legitimacy in the country but also failed to acquaint the Parliament with purpose of the competition law and to convince it that it was needed. Further, by outsourcing the deliberating and drafting process, the government had even kept the purpose of and need for the law confined to the highest echelons of the government populated by nominees of the government then in power. This had led to a lack of broad based ownership of the law in the government itself.
The exclusion of the Parliament from the adoption process meant that the Parliament was not particularly interested in urging the government to establish the tribunal and the confinement of the discussion on the law to the highest echelons of the government meant that successive governments were not particularly interested in establishing the institutions required for fully implementing the competition law.
The lack of Parliamentary oversight in passing the law meant that these petitions were brought on a broader range of procedural as well as substantive issues whereas the government's leisurely approach towards initially setting up and then maintaining the tribunal significantly increased the traffic of constitutional petitions in respect of competition matters before the Pakistani courts both from interim as well as final orders because aggrieved persons did not have an alternate remedy available to them for the redressal of their grievances.
Chapter 13 THE EFFECT OF INTERACTIONS ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAWS
The effect of interactions between the NCAs and the courts whilst small in itself (given the small percentages in respect of which aggrieved persons invoked the constitutional jurisdictions of the Indian and Pakistani courts, becomes more meaningful when examined in the broader context of actual competition enforcement in India and Pakistan. For the purposes of this section, I examine the effects of the interactions on two aspects of enforcement of the competition laws in India and Pakistan, the development of competition jurisprudence in the two countries and on the ability of the NCAs to impose and recover penalties.
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Supreme Court of Pakistan 2015-2016, from 2009 to 2015, more than 50,000 cases remained pending before the Indian Supreme Court each year (2012 was a peak year with 66692 pending cases), whilst around 20,000 cases remained pending before the Pakistani Supreme Court (2015 being a peak year with 27,639 pending cases). Whilst data for pendency at the high court levels is not available, it may be stated with confidence that it mirrors that at the Supreme Courts in the two countries. 69 The focus on recovery is not intended to detract from the greater discussion about the appropriateness of the quantum of penalties imposed by CCI which is beyond the remit of this article.
Chapter 14 Effect of interactions on development of competition jurisprudence
India
In India persons aggrieved by the orders (whether interim or final) of the CCI had the option to approach either the courts in their constitutional jurisdictions or the tribunal depending on whether the grounds of the challenge were more appropriate for one jurisdiction or the other. The courts, the tribunal and the Supreme Court exercising its competition jurisdiction issued several decisions, which supported the development of competition jurisprudence in the country. 82 CCI had initiated proceedings against the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) upon receipt of information (or complaint) from Jindal Steel, and had sought comments from it. However, rather than filing its comments, SAIL filed an application before CCI seeking an extension in the time in which it was to file its comments. CCI denied SAIL's application and through an interim order, directed the DG to investigate the allegations and directed SAIL to file its comments directly before the DG.
SAIL filed an appeal against CCI's interim order before the tribunal. By its order dated 11 th January 2010, the tribunal allowed SAIL's appeal and granted it time to file its reply before CCI. The tribunal also directed CCI to take a fresh decision, taking SAIL's reply into consideration. Through a further order dated 15 th February 2010, the tribunal also held that whilst there was no requirement for CCI to invite comments from parties to proceedings pending before it, once it had invited such comments it was not open to it to withdraw the opportunity. The tribunal also clarified that it was incumbent upon CCI to indicate reasons for having formed the view that a particular case was fit for further investigation and indeed for issuing any other order.
CCI appealed the order of the tribunal before the Supreme Court. 83 On 9 th September 2010, the Supreme Court passed on order which clarified a number of important procedural points for CCI: appeals before the tribunal may only be filed in respect of CCI orders listed in section 53(A)(1)(a) of ICA 2002; CCI had no statutory duty to issue a notice or grant a hearing to a person alleged to be in violation of the ICA 2002 before determining whether the case is fit for further investigation; CCI was a necessary and/or proper party to all proceedings brought before the tribunal; in the course of an inquiry, CCI had the power to issue interim orders in compliance with section 33 of ICA 2002; CCI was bound to record reasons while forming a prima facie view that a case was fit for further investigation and was required to do so within a reasonable time; in any matter in which CCI passed an interim order, it was bound to pass a final order within 60 days of the date of the interim order. 84 The Supreme Court's decision in this case not only helped CCI to respond to similar objections in subsequent cases 85 but also deterred potential litigants from repeatedly raising the same objections before CCI. 86 
Pakistan
In Pakistan, from 2007 to 2011 and then from 2013 to 2015, persons aggrieved by the orders of the CCP (and in the first period, unwilling to exhaust there single right of appeal by appealing directly to the Supreme Court) had little option but to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts.
Whilst the interaction between CCP and the courts in Pakistan also had a considerable impact on subsequent proceedings before CCP, this impact was largely adverse. Instead of CCP drawing support from decisions of the courts, these decisions formed the basis for further petitions against CCP. For example, persons aggrieved by proceedings initiated by CCP against the Pakistan Sugar Mills Association and its members, relied upon the interim order of the Sindh High Court in a petition filed by Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills, to obtain further restraining orders against CCP in proceedings pending before other courts in Pakistan. 87 Similarly, the Lahore High Court's decision in the LPGAP Case 88 opened floodgates of interim injunctions against show cause notices issued by CCP. Often, the courts granted these injunctions at the first hearing and after only a cursory examination of issues and mostly because 'other constitutional petitions raising similar issues have already been heard by the this Court.'
89 Although CCP challenged a number of interim injunctions before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court preferred not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the high courts. At best, the Supreme Court allowed CCP to continue with the proceedings whilst restraining it from taking any adverse action against the petitioners. In the majority of appeals, the Supreme Court simply directed the high courts to hear and dispose of the matters expeditiously without making them specifically accountable in this regard. The only impact of these decisions on the development of competition proceedings was to stall it.
Between 2011 and 2013 when the Pakistani tribunal was operational it decided one appeal on 20 th March 2013 in the matter of 1-Link Guarantee Ltd in which it dismissed CCP's final order. After being reconstituted in 2015, the tribunal decided at least six further appeals against CCP 90 and eight appeals in favour of CCP. 91 However, none of these orders established principles to develop competition jurisprudence in the country. All these orders are in any event under appeal before the before the Supreme Court that has not yet decided any of them. 92 As in the case of the courts, the CCP has had no support from the tribunal or the Supreme Court in developing competition jurisprudence.
Chapter 15 Enforcement of competition laws: imposition and recovery of penalties
In this section I examine whether the interactions have supported or stalled the NCAs in the imposition and recovery of penalties. I consider the interactions to have supported the imposition of penalties if they have provided clarity to the NCAs in determining substantive issues related to penalties including reasonableness and proportionality and have facilitated the recovery of penalties by the NCAs. Once again I examine these effects in the broader context of implementation of the competition laws in the countries.
India
The greater majority of petitions filed in India have been against interim orders which only rarely impose penalties. It is, therefore, not possible to gauge whether the courts have directly supported CCI in the imposition and recovery of penalties. However, there is sufficient data and information to establish that the tribunal and the Supreme Court (sitting in its competition jurisdiction) have supported CCI in this regard.
In the course of the period under review in this article nearly half of CCI's final orders that imposed penalties were challenged before the tribunal. However, the response of the tribunal varied from appeal to appeal. In certain appeals the tribunal facilitated the enforcement of CCI's final orders by upholding them and dismissing the appeal(s). 93 In others, the tribunal set aside CCI's order and quashed the penalty. 94 In yet other matters the tribunal upheld CCI's order but revised the quantum of penalty, 95 whereas in others still, it remanded the case to CCI for re-hearing either in its entirety or on a specific question (including the question of quantum of penalty). 96 Occasionally, appellants themselves withdrew the appeals they had filed before the tribunal in order to once again approach CCI, 97 whilst in certain others the tribunal dismissed the appeals on technicalities.
98 There was at least one occasion at which even though the Tribunal did not agree with the justification provided by CCI for imposing the penalty it chose not to interfere for the reason that the quantum of the penalty was insignificant. 99 A number of persons aggrieved by the orders of the tribunal appealed these before the Supreme Court. 100 Whilst the orders of the tribunal (and/or the Supreme Court in this regard) may not have increased the quantum of penalties recovered by CCI, 101 they have helped CCI rationalise its methodology for determining penalties. For instance:
The order of the tribunal dated 29 th October 2013 in respect of the appeal filed against CCI's order dated 23 rd April 2012 in Suo Motu Case 2/2011 Re Aluminum Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers reduced the penalty imposed by CCI from 9% of turnover to 1/10 th of the amount. The tribunal's reason for this downward revision was that CCI had failed to provide a justification for fixing the penalty at 9% and had acted arbitrarily in selecting turnover as the basis for this calculation.
102 CCI appealed the order of the tribunal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in its order dated 8 th May 2017 upheld the order of the tribunal and reiterated the significance and import of the concept of 'relevant turnover' for the purpose of calculating penalties.
In its order, the Supreme Court also stated that adopting the criteria of 'relevant turnover' would be 'more in tune with ethos of ICA 2002 and the legal principles which surround matters pertaining to imposition of penalties'. It further stated that accepting CCI's interpretation of the term 'turnover' as 'total turnover' in all situations would 'bring about very inequitable results'. The Supreme Court noted a number of examples which demonstrated that the imposition of penalty on the basis of "total turnover" in all cases would inequitably discriminate against persons guilty of the same contravention simply on the basis that they had structured their product or business lines differently.
As regards CCI's arguments that penalties were designed to act as a deterrent to anti-competitive practices, the Supreme Court held, that nevertheless 'the penalty cannot be disproportionate to the violation and it should not lead to shocking results". The Supreme Court also held that the aim of deterrence cannot justify an interpretation of ICA 2002 that may lead to "the death of the entity" itself. The Supreme Court emphasized that the doctrine of proportionality, which is based on equality and rationality, is a "constitutionally protected right, which can be traced to Article 14 as well as Article 21 of the Constitution". Finally, the Supreme Court outlined a step-wise methodology for CCI to follow in imposing penalties.
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(ii)
In another order dated 9 th December 2016 in appeals filed against CCI's order dated 25 th August 2014 in Case 3/2011 Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Limited & others, the tribunal revised the criteria on the basis of which CCI had calculated the penalty. CCI had imposed a penalty of 2% of average annual turnover of the appellant companies in the spare parts aftermarket. However, the tribunal took the view that CCI should re-calculate penalties on the basis of relevant turnover of the spare parts aftermarket. The tribunal also stated that as a matter of policy, it was not in favour of heavy penalties and preferred that CCI imposed penalties in the sprit of a 'transitory reform process'.
(iii)
In certain other cases, the tribunal did not hesitate to quash a penalty if it believed it to be unjustified. For instance in its order dated 10 th May 2016 in appeals against CCI's order dated 1 st December 2015 in P K Krishnan v. Paul Madavena Alkem Laboratories & others, the tribunal quashed the penalty imposed by CCI on the grounds that it had been imposed in violation of the principles of natural justice because the aggrieved persons had not been given an opportunity of hearing in respect of the penalties imposed.
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Pakistan
In Pakistan aggrieved parties filed constitutional petitions in respect of all final orders of the CCP that had imposed penalties. 106 In the majority of these petitions the courts passed interim orders restraining CCP from recovering penalties. At the time of writing this, the Pakistani courts had not decided any of the petitions pending before them. Consequently, even after conducting extensive hearings and passing numerous final orders, CCP remains unable to enforce these orders and to recover penalties and the only penalties it has recovered are those that were voluntarily paid by the parties.
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CCP's inability to realize penalties imposed by it is not the only adverse effect of the multiple constitutional petitions against its final orders. Another, and perhaps more fundamentally negative aspect of the situation is that, to date, CCP has received little or no support from the courts in aligning its procedures let alone its substance with the pre-existing Pakistani legal system and thereby enhancing its compatibility with and legitimacy in this system. Given that none of CCP's final orders have attained finality under the Pakistani legal system, the Pakistani competition law rather than increasingly integrating with the Pakistani legal system, remains at least as peripheral and alien to it today as it was when it was first enacted.
So far the recent establishment of the tribunal in Pakistan has done little to counter the adverse effects of these interactions. The tribunal has decided less than 20 appeals to date in none of which it has provided guidance in respect of penalties. Further, its orders in nearly all these matters are pending before Supreme Court (sitting in its competition jurisdiction). Consequently, CCP has had no support from the Supreme Court either in refining its methodology for imposing penalties or in recovering these penalties.
Chapter 16 The effects of interactions in a broader perspective
The effect of the interactions in India and Pakistan varies according to the broader implementation context of the two countries. In India, the constitutional system (represented by the courts exercising their inherent jurisdiction) and the competition system (represented by the tribunal and the Supreme Court in its competition jurisdiction) appear to have operated in support of each other particularly in the development of competition jurisprudence in the country. Orders of the tribunal had the effect of narrowing possible grounds on which CCI's orders could be challenged before the courts, whilst orders of the courts clarified due process and constitutional norms for CCI and the tribunal. The clarity provided by the decisions of the courts and the tribunal not only reduced the number of challenges filed on similar issues but also the precedents set by these orders enabled the tribunal and the courts to deal with any such challenges more effectively and expeditiously.
Conversely, the absence of a functioning competition system in Pakistan directed all challenges against orders of the CCP towards the courts and created interactions between the NCAs and the courts at more than one level. The sheer numbers of petitions and applications and appeals emanating from these petitions and the breadth of grounds that these raised, appear to have choked the legal system and prevented CCP from obtaining clarity or support on substantive and procedural issues, and more importantly, brought competition enforcement in the country to a halt.
It is tempting to dismiss the effect of the interactions on the ability of the NCAs to recover penalties as negligible due to the fact that CCI's recovery of penalties, even with a functioning competition system, is almost as low as that of the CCP, which has been mired in proceedings before the constitutional system. To do so, however, would be to fail to appreciate that even when CCI has not been able to realize penalties, it has benefited from the dialogue that between the tribunal and the Supreme Court in the competition system, whilst CCP has been deprived of this advantage. The Pakistani tribunal is still in early stages of operation and Pakistani courts have failed to decide any matters before them let alone prescribing any guidelines in support of CCP's actions. Therefore, whilst in India the disadvantage of limited recoveries is offset by the strengthening and rationalising of India's competition system, there is no such corresponding advantage in Pakistan. Going forward, this productive and supportive interaction within the competition system is likely to play a positive role in the pace at which the Indian competition law develops and integrates with India's preexisting legal system as well as the extent to which it is understood, utilised and applied in the country, which in turn, is likely to the law being implemented with greater consistency and transparency.
On the other hand, the impact of the hitherto erratic interactions between CCP, the tribunal and the courts (including the Supreme Court in its competition jurisdiction) in Pakistan remains uncertain at best. The absence of a dialogue between CCP and the tribunal or with the courts suggests that the country has still some way to go before competition law may be integrated into Pakistan's pre-existing legal system or be appropriately understood, utilised and applied in the country, and before CCP may be recognised as a significant regulatory body in the country.
Chapter 17 Conclusion
The manner in which borrowed competition laws interact with the pre-existing legal systems of the countries in which they are injected is an important indicator of the quality of performance and indeed 'success' of these laws in the countries. Comparing these interactions in the Indian and Pakistani contexts suggests that the process through which a country acquires its competition law directly and indirectly affects the quantum, nature and effect of interactions between the borrowed competition laws and the pre-existing legal systems of the country.
A country, such as India, which employs a more inclusive, bottom-up and participatory process for adopting its competition law succeeds in developing a more productive interaction between the law and the pre-existing legal system by incorporating domestic legal considerations in the law and by sufficiently engaging political institutions so that they are more invested in ensuring that the institutions necessary for meaningfully implementing the law are duly established. However, a country like Pakistan, that adopts the law through an exclusive and top-down process and keeps legal and political institutions at a distance in the adoption process, ends up with a law that falls short of domestic legal requirements and which fails to harness support from political institutions for its meaningful implementation.
The nature and effect of these interactions is linked to and varies with the broader competition implementation context of the country and therefore to the adoption process which establishes this context. It appears that effects of these interactions may be managed and be generally supportive in a country, which, like India, establishes a functioning competition system, and where aggrieved persons have the option to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts or to approach the competition system for the redress of their grievances. However, in countries like Pakistan, which fail to establish or maintain competition systems, these interactions have the power to overwhelm and frustrate the implementation of competition laws.
However, whilst the adoption process employed by a country may have shaped the interactions and their effects it does not prevent the countries, once they understand the hindering factors, from recharting their implementation trajectories and meaningfully enforcing the competition laws. Therefore, in countries like Pakistan it is still open to institutions to take ownership of the law and thereby to mitigate the impact of their earlier exclusion: for the judiciary this means clearing the backlog of competition matters pending before the courts, and for the Parliament and the government it means committing themselves to maintaining a competition system.
